Vasilis Gkatzelis

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Richard ColeProfessor of Computer Science, Courant Institute, New York UniversityDirección de correo verificada de cs.nyu.edu
Xizhi TanPhD. Student, Drexel UniversityDirección de correo verificada de drexel.edu
Daniel SchoepflinPostdoc; DIMACS - Rutgers UniversityDirección de correo verificada de drexel.edu
Tim RoughgardenColumbia UniversityDirección de correo verificada de cs.columbia.edu
Eric BalkanskiColumbia UniversityDirección de correo verificada de columbia.edu
Kostas KolliasGoogle ResearchDirección de correo verificada de google.com
Nisarg ShahAssociate Professor, University of TorontoDirección de correo verificada de cs.toronto.edu
Alkmini SgouritsaUniversity of LiverpoolDirección de correo verificada de liverpool.ac.uk
Gagan GoelResearch Scientist, GoogleDirección de correo verificada de google.com
Siddhartha BanerjeeAssociate Professor, Operations Research, Cornell UniversityDirección de correo verificada de cornell.edu
Billy JinCornell UniversityDirección de correo verificada de cornell.edu
Alexandros PsomasAssistant Professor, Purdue UniversityDirección de correo verificada de cs.purdue.edu
Vahab MirrokniGoogle Fellow, VP, Google ResearchDirección de correo verificada de google.com
Jose CorreaUniversidad de ChileDirección de correo verificada de uchile.cl
Neil OlverLondon School of Economics and Political ScienceDirección de correo verificada de lse.ac.uk
Bernardo HubermanCableLabsDirección de correo verificada de cablelabs.com
Sadra YazdanbodGoogleDirección de correo verificada de google.com
nikhil r. devanurAmazonDirección de correo verificada de nikhildevanur.com
Vijay VaziraniDistinguished Professor, Dept. of Computer Science, University of California, Irvine.Dirección de correo verificada de ics.uci.edu
Tung MaiAdobe ResearchDirección de correo verificada de adobe.com

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Vasilis Gkatzelis

Drexel University, Computer Science

Dirección de correo verificada de drexel.edu - Página principal

Algorithmic Game Theory Mechanism Design Fair Division Approximation Algorithms


Título Ordenar por citas Ordenar por año Ordenar por título	Citado por Citado por	Año
Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items R Cole, V Gkatzelis SIAM Journal on Computing 47 (3), 1211-1236, 2018	194	2018
Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare R Cole, NR Devanur, V Gkatzelis, K Jain, T Mai, VV Vazirani, ... Proceedings of the eighteenth ACM conference on Economics and Computation, 2017	184	2017
Mechanism design for fair division: allocating divisible items without payments R Cole, V Gkatzelis, G Goel Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 251-268, 2013	115	2013
Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games R Cole, JR Correa, V Gkatzelis, V Mirrokni, N Olver Games and Economic Behavior 92, 306-326, 2015	100*	2015
Optimal Cost-Sharing in General Resource Selection Games V Gkatzelis, K Kollias, T Roughgarden Operations Research, 2016	82*	2016
Pricing private data V Gkatzelis, C Aperjis, BA Huberman Electronic Markets, 1-15, 2015	82	2015
Balanced Ranking with Diversity Constraints K Yang, V Gkatzelis, J Stoyanovich Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on …, 2019	75	2019
Resolving the Optimal Metric Distortion Conjecture V Gkatzelis, D Halpern, N Shah 2020 IEEE 61st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2020	67	2020
Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents S Brânzei, V Gkatzelis, R Mehta Operations Research, 2021	66*	2021
The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions P Dütting, V Gkatzelis, T Roughgarden Mathematics of Operations Research 42 (4), 897-914, 2017	56	2017
Online Nash Social Welfare Maximization with Predictions S Banerjee, V Gkatzelis, A Gorokh, B Jin Proceedings of the 33rd ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 22), 2022	54	2022
Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location P Agrawal, E Balkanski, V Gkatzelis, T Ou, X Tan 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 22), 2022	34	2022
Positive results for mechanism design without money R Cole, V Gkatzelis, G Goel Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and …, 2013	27	2013
Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service V Gkatzelis, E Markakis, T Roughgarden Proceedings of the eighteenth ACM conference on Economics and Computation, 2017	24	2017
Coordination Mechanisms, Cost-Sharing, and Approximation Algorithms for Scheduling I Caragiannis, V Gkatzelis, C Vinci Proceedings of the thirteenth conference on Web and Internet Economics, 2017	23	2017
The impact of social ignorance on weighted congestion games D Fotakis, V Gkatzelis, AC Kaporis, PG Spirakis Theory of Computing Systems 50 (3), 559-578, 2012	22	2012
Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions E Balkanski, V Gkatzelis, X Tan 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023), 2023	20	2023
A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching R Abebe, R Cole, V Gkatzelis, JD Hartline Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete …, 2020	20	2020
Fair and efficient memory sharing: Confronting free riders EJ Friedman, V Gkatzelis, CA Psomas, S Shenker Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33 (01), 1965-1972, 2019	19	2019
Optimal data acquisition with privacy-aware agents R Cummings, H Elzayn, E Pountourakis, V Gkatzelis, J Ziani 2023 IEEE Conference on Secure and Trustworthy Machine Learning (SaTML), 210-224, 2023	18	2023

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