| School choice with consent O Kesten The Quarterly Journal of Economics 125 (3), 1297-1348, 2010 | 406* | 2010 |
| Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: A theoretical analysis Y Chen, O Kesten Journal of Political Economy 125 (1), 99-139, 2017 | 253 | 2017 |
| On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems O Kesten Journal of Economic Theory 127 (1), 155-171, 2006 | 231 | 2006 |
| A theory of school‐choice lotteries O Kesten, MU Ünver Theoretical Economics 10 (2), 543-595, 2015 | 127 | 2015 |
| Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism T Hashimoto, D Hirata, O Kesten, M Kurino, MU Ünver Theoretical Economics 9 (1), 253-277, 2014 | 123* | 2014 |
| On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems O Kesten Economic Theory 51, 677-693, 2012 | 95 | 2012 |
| Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: An experimental study Y Chen, O Kesten Games and Economic Behavior 115, 83-100, 2019 | 82 | 2019 |
| Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments? O Kesten Journal of Economic Theory 144 (5), 2209-2226, 2009 | 72 | 2009 |
| The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice R Hakimov, O Kesten International Economic Review 59 (4), 2219-2258, 2018 | 65 | 2018 |
| Matching Markets With Mixed Ownership: The Case For A Real‐Life Assignment Mechanism P Guillen, O Kesten International Economic Review 53 (3), 1027-1046, 2012 | 56* | 2012 |
| From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance: Theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms Y Chen, K Onur WZB Discussion Paper, 2013 | 51 | 2013 |
| Matching in the large: An experimental study Y Chen, M Jiang, O Kesten, S Robin, M Zhu Games and Economic Behavior 110, 295-317, 2018 | 49 | 2018 |
| Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems O Kesten International Journal of Game Theory 38, 17-21, 2009 | 41 | 2009 |
| An empirical evaluation of Chinese college admissions reforms through a natural experiment Y Chen, M Jiang, O Kesten Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 117 (50), 31696-31705, 2020 | 36 | 2020 |
| Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications U Dur, O Kesten Economic Theory 68, 251-283, 2019 | 36 | 2019 |
| Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: A maximal domain for possibility O Kesten, M Kurino Games and Economic Behavior 117, 120-143, 2019 | 35 | 2019 |
| From Boston to Shanghai to deferred acceptance: Theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms Y Chen, O Kesten International Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their …, 2011 | 32 | 2011 |
| Sequential school choice with public and private schools T Andersson, U Dur, S Ertemel, O Kesten Social Choice and Welfare, 1-46, 2024 | 27 | 2024 |
| An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism Ö Ekici, O Kesten International Journal of Game Theory 45, 655-674, 2016 | 26* | 2016 |
| The Pennsylvania Adoption Exchange improves its matching process VW Slaugh, M Akan, O Kesten, MU Ünver Interfaces 46 (2), 133-153, 2016 | 26 | 2016 |
M. Utku ÜnverProfessor of Economics at Boston College Department of EconomicsDirección de correo verificada de bc.edu
