Angelina Vidali

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Elias KoutsoupiasUniversity of OxfordDirección de correo verificada de cs.ox.ac.uk
Giorgos ChristodoulouAristotle University of ThessalonikiDirección de correo verificada de csd.auth.gr
Amos FiatProfessor of Computer Science, Tel Aviv UniversityDirección de correo verificada de tau.ac.il
Anna R. KarlinBill & Melinda Gates Chair and Professor of Computer Science and Engineering, University ofDirección de correo verificada de cs.washington.edu
Emmanouil PountourakisDrexel UniversityDirección de correo verificada de drexel.edu
Vincent ConitzerProfessor of CS, Carnegie Mellon University; Professor of CS and Philosophy, University of OxfordDirección de correo verificada de cs.cmu.edu
Carmine VentreKing's College LondonDirección de correo verificada de kcl.ac.uk
Paolo SerafinoDepartment of Computer Science - University of OxfordDirección de correo verificada de cs.ox.ac.uk

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Angelina Vidali

University of West Attica

Dirección de correo verificada de di.uoa.gr - Página principal

Computer Science Algorithmic Game theory Mechanism design


Título Ordenar por citas Ordenar por año Ordenar por título	Citado por Citado por	Año
A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms G Christodoulou, E Koutsoupias, A Vidali Algorithmica 55 (4), 729-740, 2009	117	2009
A Lower Bound of 1 + φ for Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms E Koutsoupias, A Vidali International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science, 454-464, 2007	59	2007
A characterization of 2-player mechanisms for scheduling G Christodoulou, E Koutsoupias, A Vidali Algorithms-ESA 2008: 16th Annual European Symposium, Karlsruhe, Germany …, 2008	33	2008
A Lower Bound of 1+φ for Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms E Koutsoupias, A Vidali Algorithmica 66, 211-223, 2013	32	2013
Approaching utopia: strong truthfulness and externality-resistant mechanisms A Fiat, A Karlin, E Koutsoupias, A Vidali Proceedings of the 4th conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer …, 2013	22	2013
A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing E Pountourakis, A Vidali Algorithmica 63 (4), 831-860, 2012	18	2012
The geometry of truthfulness A Vidali International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, 340-350, 2009	13	2009
Mechanism design for scheduling with uncertain execution time V Conitzer, A Vidali Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 28 (1), 2014	12	2014
Truthfulness on a budget: trading money for approximation through monitoring P Serafino, C Ventre, A Vidali Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 34, 1-24, 2020	8	2020
A characterization of n-player strongly monotone scheduling mechanisms A Kovács, A Vidali Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015	5	2015
Extending characterizations of truthful mechanisms from subdomains to domains A Vidali Internet and Network Economics, 2011	4	2011
Multi-parameter mechanism design under budget and matroid constraints M Henzinger, A Vidali European Symposium on Algorithms, 192-202, 2011	1	2011
Game-theoretic analysis of networks: Designing mechanisms for scheduling A Vidali		2009
Game-theoretic analysis of networks. A Vidali University of Athens, 2009		2009

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