Alberto Marchesi
Alberto Marchesi
Ph.D. Student, Politecnico di Milano
Verified email at polimi.it - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Pessimistic leader-follower equilibria with multiple followers
S Coniglio, N Gatti, A Marchesi
252017
Bilevel programming approaches to the computation of optimistic and pessimistic single-leader-multi-follower equilibria
N Basilico, S Coniglio, N Gatti, A Marchesi
SEA 75, 1-14, 2017
202017
Leadership in singleton congestion games
A Marchesi, S Coniglio, N Gatti
International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence 2018, 447-453, 2018
162018
Computing the strategy to commit to in polymatrix games
G De Nittis, A Marchesi, N Gatti
AAAI, 2018
162018
Trembling-Hand Perfection in Extensive-Form Games with Commitment
G Farina, A Marchesi, C Kroer, N Gatti, T Sandholm
IJCAI, 2018
132018
Computing a pessimistic stackelberg equilibrium with multiple followers: The mixed-pure case
S Coniglio, N Gatti, A Marchesi
Algorithmica 82 (5), 1189-1238, 2020
11*2020
Bilevel programming methods for computing single-leader-multi-follower equilibria in normal-form and polymatrix games
N Basilico, S Coniglio, N Gatti, A Marchesi
EURO Journal on Computational Optimization 8 (1), 3-31, 2020
82020
Leadership in singleton congestion games: What is hard and what is easy
M Castiglioni, A Marchesi, N Gatti, S Coniglio
Artificial Intelligence 277, 103177, 2019
82019
Be a Leader or Become a Follower: The Strategy to Commit to with Multiple Leaders.
M Castiglioni, A Marchesi, N Gatti
IJCAI, 123-129, 2019
82019
Learning to correlate in multi-player general-sum sequential games
A Celli, A Marchesi, T Bianchi, N Gatti
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 13076-13086, 2019
82019
Leadership in Congestion Games: Multiple User Classes and Non-Singleton Actions.
A Marchesi, M Castiglioni, N Gatti
IJCAI, 485-491, 2019
72019
Quasi-perfect stackelberg equilibrium
A Marchesi, G Farina, C Kroer, N Gatti, T Sandholm
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33, 2117-2124, 2019
52019
On the Complexity of Nash Equilibrium Reoptimization.
A Celli, A Marchesi, N Gatti
UAI, 1-10, 2017
42017
Learning probably approximately correct maximin strategies in simulation-based games with infinite strategy spaces
A Marchesi, F Trov˛, N Gatti
arXiv preprint arXiv:1911.07755, 2019
32019
No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium
A Celli, A Marchesi, G Farina, N Gatti
arXiv preprint arXiv:2004.00603, 2020
22020
Leadership in congestion games: Multiple user classes and non-singleton actions (extended version)
A Marchesi, M Castiglioni, N Gatti
arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.13108, 2019
22019
Be a leader or become a follower: The strategy to commit to with multiple leaders (extended version)
M Castiglioni, A Marchesi, N Gatti
arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.13106, 2019
22019
Computing the Strategy to Commit to in Polymatrix Games (Extended Version)
G De Nittis, A Marchesi, N Gatti
arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.11914, 2018
22018
Signaling in Bayesian Network Congestion Games: the Subtle Power of Symmetry
M Castiglioni, A Celli, A Marchesi, N Gatti
arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.05190, 2020
12020
A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria
N Gatti, M Gilli, A Marchesi
Games and Economic Behavior, 2020
2020
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Articles 1–20